Context for Examination

Land Reform - The Neoliberal Response

Overview

The most lasting effect of apartheid in South Africa has been land distribution. While Blacks have been integrated into the upper and middle class echelons of the South African economy and exercised political control over the country since the election of Nelson Mandela, the distribution of arable land has remained highly uneven. Because the skewed land distribution has its origins in Dutch imperial rule over South Africa, the redistribution issue is one of the most explicitly racial dialogues that is still in contention in the country. While the major political and economic institutions in South Africa do everything they can to play down the race issue in their country, the land distribution conflict reveals the tensions that still clearly remain about the countries racial inequality. Because the lines of the battle are racial lines, it is an especially volatile issue for the government. Land distribution also offers a window in to the contentious issue of neoliberal reform. A population without land or recourses is forced into the city to participate in the labor market. They become a reserve army of labor that is extremely beneficial to capitalist and the neoliberal project. Examining how South African institutions stand and manipulate the land distribution issue shows where they stand in relation to neoliberalism and how the process of neoliberalism operates in South Africa. The proponents of land reform represent a movement against the forces capital. The points at which the sides of the landless and the neoliberal clash reveals the strengths and weakness of the neoliberal forces, and their ability to defend against popular discontent. ^bhz

Neoliberal Interest in South Africa

South Africa’s particular history and geography situates it in an extremely unique position in relation to the international neoliberal community. Whereas the economic struggles in many of Southern Africa’s countries go relatively unnoticed, South Africa draws the attention of the first world, changing the stakes and points of leverage for the players involved. There are a number of reasons for this extra attention. The first is the legacy of apartheid. The fall of the apartheid regime was heard all around the first world. When Nelson Mandela won the Nobel piece prize he became a household name and his battle was adopted as an international victory for humanitarianism. South Africa became the representative of a post-imperial, black-ruled nation. South-Africa has done everything possible to capitalize on this image. Their finance ministry has remained in the hands of the neoliberal Afrikaner, Trevor Manuel. Thabo Mbeki, the president who succeeded Mandela, was educated in Britain, graduating with a degree in economics ^bhz10. Both officials are staunch neoliberals, and their places in the government make South Africa foreign investor friendly.

South Africa’s geography adds two more incentives for neoliberal interest in internal economic conflicts. Their land is rich in natural recourses, and they are the world’s largest producer of gold, diamonds, platinum, and other precious metals. Their exports go primarily to Europe and the United States. For this reason, the sustenance of the South African economy is an international concern. South Africa has tried to use the international interest in their mining recourses to encourage international investment in their industries ^bhz19.

The third source of international interest stems from their relationship with Zimbabwe. The neoliberal panic over the rapid and violent land reform movement in Zimbabwe has put additional pressure on South Africa. This is partially motivated by the fear that Zimbabwe’s radicalism will spread to its next door neighbor and cause an epidemic of anti-European, anti-neoliberal land redistribution ^bhz1. Britain, Zimbabwe’s former colonial ruler, has been applying pressure to president Mbeki to turn against the Mugabe regime and join the neoliberal side of the debate. The Financial Times lashed out at Mugabe proclaiming “The corruption of zealotry of the government of Robert Mugabe and the chaotic land reform programmed it has used to destroy the commercial farming sector have hugely aggravated problems caused by drought and erratic weather conditions ^bhz3.” What this British financier is upset about is that redistributing farm land to the impoverished and landless blacks of Zimbabwe has broken the monopoly of the white commercial farming class who no longer has the land to grow as much food, or the starvation necessary to sell the food. The Financial Times goes on to complain about the government monopoly that Mugabe has imposed on the importation and distribution of maize, taking the food supply out of the hands of industry. The imported maize comes primarily from South Africa. The Times says, “The one man who can and must curb Mr. Mugabe’s madness is Thabo Mbeki, South Africa’s president. The rest of the world can do nothing without his involvement ^bhz3.” They are begging South Africa to starve Zimbabwe into stopping their land reform and putting the food supply back into the hands of the commercial farming class. Despite South Africa’s rabid desire to conform to the wishes of the neoliberal world, they have thus far refused to sell out Mubeke’s land reform movement. The reasons behind this move are extremely complex and speak to the heart of the South African land reform conflict.

Zimbabwe's Influence on Neoliberal Reform

For South Africa to maintain their position in the world economy as an upcoming third-world nation conducive to the demands of neoliberalism it is essential that they separate themselves from what Tony Blair calls “maverick nations” in the eyes of investors ^bhz6. When Blair says "Maverick Nations" he is referring to Zimbabwe. The major difference that Mbeki has held up to his neoliberal critics is that Zimbabwe's land reform movement is supported and enforced by the government while South Africa's remains a grassroots movement^bhz33. Mbeki claims South Africa will never resort to Zimbabwe style land-grabs, and that South Africa's land reform strategies are working. However, their refusal to starve Zimbabwe out of land reform speaks to the truth of the situation. South Africa is sitting on the edge of a land reform crisis that would likely be far more destructive and violent than the worst moments of the Zimbabwe situation. Not only is South Africa's landless population larger, but the fact that the government opposes the reformers makes the tensions in the country even more explosive. An investor risk analysis publication expresses this sentiment saying: "As awful as things are in Zimbabwe, the truth is that the government still calls the shots. In South Africa, the government looks to be increasingly unable to control what is a genuine grassroots movement against government failings ^bhz33." In Zimbabwe land reform means land reform, in South Africa it could potentially mean revolution.

The neoliberal government’s response to the landless peoples’ outrage has been to channel the poor’s outrage into other, more neoliberal friendly issues, and to publicly deny the existence of a radical land reform movement. At times the government official statements on the land reform issue have bordered on comedy. Nana Zenani, spokeswoman for the agricultural and land affairs ministry said “Besides landless people, I’m not sure who is complaining about landlessness. I am not sure where this public outcry is coming from ^bhz4.” There are twenty-six million landless people in South Africa making up around fifty-percent of the population, enough said ^bhz12. On the other hand, playing dumb is about the only feasibly tactic for the government land-reform officials in South Africa. The lack of land reform progress since Mbeki took control of office is stunning. Nelson Mandela promised that 30% of the land would be redistributed by 1999. Only 2% has actually been redistributed. White landowners still own 69% of the land in a country where 80% of the population is black ^bhz3.

When not denying the existence of the problem South African neoliberals have tried to channel land-distribution outrage into the unemployment outrage. Rather than give people their own farm land, the government and the international forces of neoliberalism would much rather see the landless population employed and living in the cities. A conference on “the potential for opposition forces” (i.e. radical anti-government grassroots movements) identified “the clamor for jobs as a more important priority for the poor than the demand for land” ^bhz4.5. Mbeki further echoes this sentiment saying “The problem in South Africa is homelessness, not land. ^bhz4.5” He is implying that the solution is to give people apartments from which they can have jobs rather than give them land on which they will grow their own food. This effectiveness of this strategy has been decreasing since 2001 when the landless movement began to organize itself and resist. Still, the government does everything they can to appease the liberals without talking about land reform.

Government Repression

There is ample evidence that the government’s official statements on land reform are a front put up for the international investment community. Not only does the government know how severe the land distribution problem is, they have been actively attempting to undermine the proponents of land reform and suppress public information about the extent of this radical movement. It is the power of this movement that is keeping Mbeki from selling out Zimbabwe. Although the government and press continually publish statements saying that their people are not in support of Zimbabwe, Mugabe's speech was resoundingly cheered at 2002 Earth Summit in Johannesburg ^bhz4.5. The OAU (Organization of African Unity), set up a committee to support Zimbabwe with South Africa on the board of directors in 2001. The rhetoric of the landless movement's most vocal activist, Andile Mngxitama, has distinctly supported Mugabe and his tactics. He has threatened "Farms will descend into chaos unless the Mbeki government speeds up land reform to satisfy the demands of landless blacks." He has threatened a "race-war" ^bhz6. This race-war is in fact a reality although one would never know it reading the statements from the government. Over 1,000 white farmer have been murdered in over 5,000 attacks on white farms over the last decade ^bhz7. In 2001 a group called "Black-Jack" was discovered circulating instructional videos on how to attack white farms and murder their owners ^bhz8.

The government reaction to this phenomenon has been to repress evidence of the social unrest. News coverage claims that the attacks are "not seen as politically motivated," and statements have been made that "people are more directly angry at the government" ^bhz4than the white farmers they are killing. More concrete measures than media slanting have been taken as well. In July of 2000 South Africa stopped publishing their crime statistics. Apparently crime had gotten so bad in urban and poor rural areas that there was no one willing to enter the areas who would accurately tabulate the statistics ^bhz9. Probably the most suspect action of the South African government was an internal investigation of the NLC board specifically targeted at Andile Mngxitama who was accused of making "antigovernment" statements and of encouraging "Zimbabwe-style land grabs" ^bhz18. The report caused him to be censored. In April 2002 he and five other LPM leaders were arrested and held custody in a peaceful and legal protest in Ermelo. After the arrest Mngxitama said "This is an example of the kind of systematic harassment landless people face in South Africa. People were arrested while dispersing form a peaceful and well organized march" ^bhz2. The governments has pursued a policy of actively repressing the landless movement and then downplaying its significance to the public. This strategy is in perfect accordance with the dilemma that the landless movement causes for them. They simultaneously maintain the order of their nation and the appearance that neoliberalism will operate smoothly in their country.

Another spin of the South African government has been to frame the social unrest in less dangerous language. In the three pronged land policy (restitution, redistribution, and land tenure), restitution has been the government's primary public focus. This is because restitution can be framed in humanitarian language that downplays the radical politics and economic necessity of land reform. When threats of a Zimbabwe-style land grabbing and race war spurred the government to give up 1.9 billion rand to land reform this year, finance minister Trevor Manuel said that funding land restitution was is recognition of "the critical role it plays in restoring the rightfully belongs to those formerly dispossessed," "It is the right thing to do" ^bhz26. This sounds much better than saying 'we have been forced into submission by a peasant movement that threatens anarchy unless we give them land,' which is the truth of the situation. Manuel wisely spins the story to play to a humanitarian cause of avenging the injustices of apartheid. Rather than a blow to neoliberalism, the land reform grant looks like a blow to the racism of old, and an endorsement of a new, racially harmonious South Africa. At the same time Manuel is throwing a bone to the land reform movement through restitution, the more significant and politically radical strategies of redistribution and land tenure are being under-funded and slowed down.

Government Slowdowns

Like any good protestors, the South African government has learned their non-violent resistance techniques well. One of their most effective strategies in walking the line between maintaining order and pleasing investors has been to create liberal programs and then fail to execute them. The most crippling policy still in effect is the "willing-buyer, willing-seller" policy that was designed by the British in Zimbabwe's independence negotiations. Clearly, the program was not particularly effective there. It is based on the idea that white farmers will "willingly" sell their land cheaply to landless black peasants who are government subsidized. The reality is that white farmers delay the sale of land by holding out for the best price from the government, and furthermore don't want blacks in their neighborhoods at all. They are therefore not "willing" to sell their land ^bhz22. This policy infinitely slowed the land reform movement, pleasing the neoliberals immensely. The government has since reluctantly begun to expropriate land in small portions after peasants threatened to start using Mugabe's land-grabbing tactics.

Another 'doomed to failure' program was agricultural minister Thoko Didiza's Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD). Drafted in response to a mass-mobilization of the landless in 2001, the program was supposed to subsidize the sale of land from white commercial farmers to black landless peasants and train the landless to use the land for commercial output. This program was effective in meeting the demands of the protectors, but has since been under-funded to the point that is ceases to function at all. The program received only 50-million rand in 2002/2003 while a single regional project costs about 20 million rand ^bhz26. The program has now stopped processing new applications, and it appears to be well on its way to disappearing all together. This under-funding method is not an isolated case. With neoliberal reforms plated inside many of South Africa's key land reform institutions, even funded programs do not necessarily spend their money. Between 1994 and 2001 the Department of Land Affairs spent only 55% of its budget^bhz38. This way, the government could please the land reform movement leaders by citing large budget statistics and please the international investment community by slowing land reform and keeping the peasants off of the land.

Recent Neoliberal Victories

Bunk social programs have also contributed to the neoliberal effort by giving the government political room to maneuver. The public victories for the landless tend to be matched by underhanded jabs at them. The recent budget increase for land reform and the creation of a revised Communal Land Act ^bhz24 were quickly followed by an attack on the Zimbabwe landless movement. Zimbabwe was forced to return land that it took away from South African farmers over the Zimbabwe border. This move went again the Land Restitution act that exempts government's from paying for land seized under resettlement programs and reestablished the precedent of the Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement which forbids either company from encroaching on the investments of the other with land reform policy ^bhz23. This is the first anti-Zimbabwe move that the South African government has dared to make. It is clearly a move that appeals to the international investment community that has been begging South Africa to pressure Zimbabwe for years. No major protest to the move has occurred in the two weeks between this event and the writing of this paper, and while one may still occur, the government is clearly gambling that Februaries budget increase and the announcement of the Communal Land Bill draft two days before will offset the move in the eyes of the land reform movement. Similarly, the action signals to investors that South Africa is not giving in on land reform, even if some concessions have been made.

Conclusions

The South African government has been put in the incredibly awkward position of being everyone's enemy. Their are obviously hated and opposed by the landless movement, who in increasingly threatens to turn South Africa into another Zimbabwe. The Financial Times describes this possibility as "overhanging...like the sword of Damocles ^bhz38." More surprisingly, they are recently also receiving intense criticism and active resistance from the white commercial farmers. The violence and hostility directed towards them by landless blacks has turned them in favor of land reform. While they want it on their own terms and in forms that will benefit them financially, they still favor the forward progression of the process. On top of this, the forces of neoliberalism are applying tremendous pressure on Mbeki to actively oppose Mugabe in Zimbabwe. Finally, this volatile mix of potentially explosive ingredients has been enough to scare investors away from seriously financing in South Africa, which prevents the country from being able to adequately fund any remedies to the complaints of the various factions. It would seem that the land reform issue has South African government in a vicious circle that is bent on self-destruction. This, however, has not happened. The only explanation for this is the unchallenged political preeminence of the ANC, and their strong connections to organized labor. The ANC's role as South Africa's liberating party, and the failure of opposition parties to work together and unite dissenting factions has given the ANC virtually uncontested political security. They have magically been able to displease everybody and still win elections easily. The land reform issue offers a the countries' largest threat to this scenario. The Political Risk Services Group signals this saying that Land Reform's "importance lies in its potential to unite the country's disaffected in a way no other issues can ^bhz33." While is is unlikely that white farmers and black landless will come together to oppose the ANC, enough social unrest from the landless or enough financial insecurity in the international investment community could rupture the country to the point where the ANC splits or loses its support base. For now, the government's survival depends on its ability to stay on the tight rope between pleasing land reformers and neoliberal investors. Leaning too far either way will send them off the edge. In a country that often seems to be frothing for revolution, there will be no safety net for the ANC and President Mbeki to fall into.

Link to information on the Landless Movement

Citations

1 "SA Land Reform Also in Crisis." South Africa Press Association. May 24, 2000.

2 "Mpumalanga Protsetors Arrested After Threatening Land Invasions." Africa News. April 30, 2002.

3 "Zimbabwe's Misery." Financial Times. December 13, 2002.

4 "South Africa's Landless Still Battle Legacy of Apartheid." Manchester Guardian Weekly. November 6, 2002.

4.5 "Zimbabwe's Rhetoric Disturbs South African Farmers." The Irish Times. September 6, 2002.

5 "Two Worlds Collide As South Africa's Poor March On Earth Summit." Agence France Press. August 31, 2002.

6 "African Committee Lends Backing to Mugabe's Land Grab." Sunday Herald (Scotland). July 15, 2001.

7 "White Farmers See Themselves As Targets in South Africa." Deutsche Presse-Agentur. April 13, 2001.

8 "Farmers Put On Alert As Murder Videos Circulate." Sunday Herald (Scotland). April 1, 2001.

9 "Violence A Well-Kept Secret in South Africa." Angence France Presse. February 16, 2001.